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FOURTH AMENDMENT-TOWARD
POLICE DISCRETION IN
DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Florida v. Wells,1 a unanimous Supreme Court held that if the
police do not have a policy governing the opening of closed contain-
ers encountered during an inventory search, then the opening of
such a container during the inventory search of an impounded auto-
mobile violates fourth amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures.2
The decision requires scrutiny for two reasons. First, Wells is
notable primarily for its dicta regarding police discretion in deter-
mining the scope of inventory searches, and, as such, changes the
law very little. It is therefore questionable whether this decision ad-
equately resolves the split in the circuits over how to apply prece-
dent to inventory search cases. Second, the dicta of the opinion
suggests that the next time the Court hears an inventory search
case, it will change the law to conform to the dicta in Wells; in so
doing, the Court will grant the police a measure of discretion to
determine the scope of inventory searches. This Note anticipates
this sequence of events, and therefore also evaluates the "new" law
to determine its effects on the rights of the individual motorist.
This Note concludes that the Court did act to resolve a split in
the circuit courts over the application of Colorado v. Bertine,3 a
landmark decision concerning inventory searches. Yet, there seems
to be no answer for why the Court chose to address the split
through the facts of Wells, which do not present the issue in
controversy.
According to dicta in this decision, the Court seems prepared to
1 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990).
2 Id. at 1635.
3 479 U.S. 367 (1987). See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text for an indepth
discussion of this case.
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move toward excluding less evidence by granting police a measure
of discretion to open closed containers. This Note concludes, how-
ever, that such a law probably will not have that effect on the
amount of evidence courts admit. This result would be true even if
the Court accepts a standard allowing absolute police discretion to
determine the scope of the search.
II. BACKGROUND
A. FACTS
Martin Leslie Wells drove his friend's BMW on State Highway
207, near Palatka, Florida,4 on the night of February 11, 1985.5
Florida State Trooper Rodney Adams observed the car travelling
sixty-one miles per hour in a fifty miles per hour zone and pulled
Wells over.6 Nothing else about the movement of the car attracted
notice. 7 According to Trooper Adams, Wells conducted himself as
a total gentleman upon getting out of the car.8 Adams noticed the
smell of alcohol on Wells' breath9 and administered roadside sobri-
ety tests. 10 After conducting these tests, Trooper Adams informed
Wells that he was under arrest for driving under the influence of
alcohol and would be transported to the station for a breathalizer
test.1 a Wells commented that he was cold and that he wanted to go
to the car to get his jacket. 12 To protect himself, Trooper Adams
accompanied Wells to the BMW and visually surveyed the interior
of car.'8 The officer saw money, totalling three thousand dollars,
scattered on the floorboard. 14 Upon inquiry, Wells made several
contradictory statements about the origin and his knowledge of the
cash. 15
Trooper Adams requested to view the contents of the trunk,
and Wells consented. 16 However, neither Wells nor Adams suc-
4 Joint Appendix at 33, Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990) (No. 88-1835)
[hereinafter Joint Appendix].
5 Id. at 1.
6 Id. at 34.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 35.
9 Id. at 36.
10 Id. at 37.
11 Id. at 57.
12 Id. at 58.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 60.
15 Id. at 78. He first claimed the money came from selling the car; then he denied
knowing about the money at all.
16 Id. at 92.
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ceeded in opening the lock.17 A wrecker towed the car to a local
garage, where Trooper Adams finally succeeded in opening the
trunk.'8 Adams spoke with his corporal about whether to perform
an inventory search, and the corporal responded that he [Adams]
should do what he thought best.' 9 The garage attendant testified
that Trooper Adams wanted to run a "real good" inventory search
of the car, because he believed it contained drugs.20 Trooper Ad-
ams proceeded to search the car thoroughly, looking in the glove
compartment, the ashtrays, underneath the seats, and in the crack
between the seats. 21 He found two roachclips in the ashtray but was
unable to determine their age.22 Adams then went back to the car's
trunk and removed a suitcase which felt as though it contained
something.28 Using "a couple of knives," he pried the suitcase
open.24 The garage attendant further testified that Trooper Adams
felt sure the suitcase contained drugs.25 Adams assumed that open-
ing the suitcase came under the authority of the inventory search;
however, after discovering eighteen pounds of marijuana inside the




On August 2, 1985, Wells filed an amended motion to suppress
all evidence seized on February 12, 1985.27 The motion was de-
nied.28 The defendant thereafter entered a plea of nlo contendere to
the charge of possession of a controlled substance, but specifically
reserved the right to appeal the ruling on the motion to suppress. 29
The State of Florida stipulated that the outcome of the motion to
suppress would determine the outcome of the case. 0
On August 21, 1986, Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeals
17 Id. at 67.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 88. Trooper Adams was not required to get the corporal's permission to run
the search. Apparently, he only sought advice from a superior because he was not clear
on the proper procedure. See id. at 115.
20 Id. at 141.
21 Id. at 69.
22 Id. at 70.
23 Id. at 72.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 145.
26 Id. at 83. Apparently, Trooper Adams asked the garage attendants. Only Adams
and the two garage attendants were present during the search. Id. at 68.
27 Id. at 1.
28 Id. at 22.
29 Id. at 235.
30 Id. at 23.
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ruled that Trooper Adams' search of the closed suitcase violated
fourth amendment guarantees against unreasonable searches and
reversed the trial court's judgment.3 1 The Supreme Court of Flor-
ida affirmed the decision, holding that the search of the suitcase vio-
lated the fourth amendment on both consent search and inventory
search theories.32 The State of Florida petitioned for a rehearing,
which the Florida Supreme Court granted.33 The court again held
the search to be unconstitutional.3 4
The Florida Supreme Court, at the rehearing of State v. Wells, 35
decided three issues of law. First, the court held that the defend-
ant's consent to the search of the trunk did not authorize Trooper
Adams to open and search the locked suitcase.3 6 Second, it held
that the state troopers acted properly in impounding the car, ren-
dering admissible into evidence the two roachclips found in the ash-
tray.s 7 Finally, the court, on the authority of Colorado v. Bertine,3a
ruled that opening the suitcase violated fourth amendment protec-
tions.3 9 The only issue presented to the United States Supreme
Court on certiorari was the third issue; namely, whether opening the
locked suitcase during the automobile inventory search violated the
fourth amendment guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures.40
The Florida Supreme Court found the application of law to the
facts straightforward. The United States Supreme Court had held in
Bertine that the admission into evidence of narcotics found in a
backpack during a standard inventory search of an automobile did
not violate constitutional protections.4 1 In Bertine, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, emphasized in a footnote that
police department procedures required the opening of closed con-
tainers and the listing of their contents.42 The Florida Supreme
31 Wells v. State, 492 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
32 Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 266, 271. The consent search theory questioned
whether Wells' grant of permission to Trooper Adams to look in the trunk justified Ad-
ams' opening the locked suitcase found in the trunk. Id. at 271.
33 Id. at 248.
34 State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464, 468 (Fla. 1989).
35 539 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1989).
36 Id. at 467.
37 Id. at 469. The court held that the money lying in the car justified impoundment
and described the impoundment as "reasonable." Id.
38 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
39 Wells, 539 So. 2d at 469. See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Bertine.
40 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court at 1, Florida v.
Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990) (No. 88-1835).
41 479 U.S. at 369.
42 Wells, 539 So. 2d at 468 (citing Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 n.6.). The complete text of
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Court quoted the language in the footnote as part of its holding,
adding emphasis to the words "mandated the opening of closed
containers and the listing of their contents. ' 43 The Florida court
then quoted Justice Blackmun's Bertine concurrence: "[I]t is permis-
sible for police officers to open dosed containers in an inventory
search only if they are following standard police procedures that mandate the
opening of such containers in every impounded vehicle."44
The Florida court concluded that since the State Patrol fol-
lowed no mandatory policy concerning the opening of closed con-
tainers, Trooper Adams search of the suitcase violated the Bertine
rule.45 The opinion then stated,, "the police under Bertine must
mandate either that all containers will be open during an inventory
search or that no containers will be opened. There can be no room
for discretion." 46
C. RELEVANT PRECEDENT
Inventory searches involving automobiles lend themselves to a
limited number of scenarios. Officers may or may not impound a
car for objectively justifiable reasons. Similarly, the officers may or
may not search the car according to procedure. If the trial court
finds that the officers justifiably impounded the car and searched it
in accordance with established police procedures, then evidence ob-
tained during these warrantless searches is admissible under the
fourth amendment. The Supreme Court has applied this rule since
at least 1976.47 The cases since 1976 have helped to develop the
simple rule later articulated concerning Bertine: "inventory searches
conducted pursuant to standard criteria are reasonable per se." 48
footnote six states, "[W]e emphasize that, in this case, the trial court found that the
Police Department's procedures mandated the opening of closed containers and the list-
ing of their contents. Our decisions have always adhered to the requirement that inven-
tories be conducted according to standardized criteria." 479 U.S. at 374 n.6.
43 Wells, 539 So. 2d at 469.
44 Id. (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 (Blackmun, J., concurring)) (emphasis added
by the Florida Supreme Court). Justices Powell and O'Connor joined Justice Blackmun
in his Bertine concurrence. The Florida court also noted that these three justices con-
curred in the majority opinion and specifically cited footnote six as a reason for doing
so. Therefore, the Florida court stated that "[a]s a ground upon which a majority of the
Court agreed, the 'no discretion' requirement constitutes a clear holding of the Bertine
Court." Id. at 469 n.5.
45 Id. But see infra notes 85 and 131 for a discussion of what constitutes a mandatory
policy.
46 Id.
47 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
48 Note, The Automobile Inventory Search Exception: The Supreme Court Disregards Fourth
Amendment Rights in Colorado v. Bertine-The States Must Protect the Motorists, 62 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 366, 371-72 (1987) [hereinafter Note, The Automobile Inventory Search Exception]; see
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In South Dakota v. Opperman,4 9 the Court held that a routine,
warrantless inventory search of an illegally parked car, which had
been impounded by the police, did not violate the fourth amend-
ment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures; ac-
cordingly, the marijuana found in the unlocked glove compartment
constituted admissible evidence.50 Chief Justice Warren Burger,
writing for the majority, noted that cars retain a lesser degree of
fourth amendment protection than houses for two reasons: first, the
mobile nature of the automobile; and second, the lessened expecta-
tion of privacy. 51 Since the car in question had been abandoned
temporarily and was not in danger of disappearing, Chief Justice
Burger primarily addressed the issue of reduced expectations of pri-
vacy. He articulated three reasons for the lessened privacy expecta-
tions. First, law enforcement officers during routine activity
frequently have contact with automobiles. Second, automobiles are
subject to extensive government regulation and inspection. Third,
travel by automobile is public by nature. 52 He ultimately justified
the warrantless search through this lessened expectation of privacy.
Interestingly, Chief Justice Burger noted precedent which de-
clared unconstitutional administrative searches of buildings when
no warrant had been obtained.53 He also elaborated on the fact that
since the automobile inventory search was non-criminal, the warrant
requirement which presupposed probable cause did not apply.54
However, he noted these propositions in footnotes and did not ad-
dress the seeming contradiction.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, wrote that the police must first
specifically determine that a car is to be inventoried, and second
must exhaust efforts to find the owner to get permission before an
inventory search may take place. 55
In Illinois v. Lafayette, the Court held the inventory search of a
also Wells, 539 So. 2d at 471 (Shaw, J., dissenting). Justice Shaw believed that since
Trooper Adams followed his standard operating procedure, the search was constitu-
tional under Bertine. Therefore, Justice Shaw and the other dissenters thought that the
search had been sufficiently regulated. However, the Highway Patrol Manual was not in
effect at the time of the search. This lack of a manual later assumed a significant role in
the United States Supreme Court's determination of whether Trooper Adams' inventory
search was significantly regulated. See infra note 85. See also infra note 131 for discussion
of what constitutes standard operating criteria.
49 428 U. S. 364 (1976).
50 Id. at 367.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 369.
53 Id. at 367 n.2 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)).
54 Id. at 370 n.5.
55 Id. at 393 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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handbag at the time of arrest met constitutional requirements. 56 In
Lafayette, police arrested an individual involved in a protest and took
him to the station for routine processing. While listing the contents
of his handbag pursuant to standard procedure, drugs were found.57
Although this search did not involve a car, it is relevant to Wells for
two reasons. First, instead of determining whether the object of the
inventory search has a reduced expectation of privacy, the Court fo-
cused on whether probable cause was required, given the exigent
circumstances. If probable cause was not required, then as a matter
of law, the need to acquire a warrant is obviated.58 Second, the
Court stated that a possibility of less intrusive means did not render
the search unreasonable. 59 Chief Justice Burger noted that the pur-
pose of Supreme Court review was to pass on the constitutionality
of a particular search rather than to give instructions on the best way
to conduct routine administrative duties.60 This case shifted the fo-
cus of the Court away from the reduced expectation of privacy ra-
tionale to concerns over the police's need for efficiency in
conducting inventory searches.
In Bertine, the Court held that during the routine inventory
search of an impounded vehicle, the opening of a container found
inside the vehicle did not violate the fourth amendment if it oc-
curred in accordance with established procedures. 6 1 In Bertine, the
police conducted an inventory search on a van which had been
properly impounded after the arrest of the owner for driving while
intoxicated. While listing all items in the van, the police opened a
closed backpack to list its contents and found illegal drugs.62 Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Opperman and Lafayette princi-
ples governed the facts at hand, because Bertine also presented a rea-
sonable police regulation concerning administrative searches
applied in good faith.6 3 He extended these principles to add that
during a valid search, asking police to make subtle distinctions be-
tween compartments in the car must give way to completion of the
task at hand.64 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, in response to the defend-
ant's argument, ruled that the discretion to allow the officer to im-
56 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 647.
60 Id. at 648.
61 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 369 (1987).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 374, 376.
64 Id. at 375 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821 (1982)).
19911 847
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
pound the car had not been precluded by precedent. 65 Justice
Blackmun concurred, arguing that the police did not have discretion
to determine the scope of the search.66 Justice Marshall, in his dis-
sent, continued to advocate balancing the government's interest
against the individual's expectation of privacy. 67 Bertine suggests,
however, that inventory searches of automobiles completed pursu-
ant to standard criteria serve a government interest which outweighs
an individual's privacy interest.68
III. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
The Supreme Court unanimously held unconstitutional
Trooper Adams' search and affirmed the Florida Supreme Court's
holding that the evidence obtained through the inventory search
must be suppressed. 69 Thus, the conviction was thrown out.70
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion, was joined by
Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice Brennan
filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. Justices
Blackmun and Stevens each filed separate concurring opinions.
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist began by re-
viewing the Florida court's facts, reasoning, and precedent.71
Although he affirmed the lower court ruling,72 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist began his analysis by distinguishing the law applied by the
Florida court from the law of Bertine.73 He stated that the Florida
court's reasoning missed the heart of both the opinion and the con-
currence in Bertine.74 Quoting Bertine, he wrote "nothing [in the
controlling cases] prohibits the exercise of police discretion so long
as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and the
basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal ac-
tivity." 75 The need for standard criteria,7 6 he continued, came from
65 Id. at 375.
66 Id. at 374 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 377 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
69 Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1635 (1990).
70 Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 23. The state of Florida had stipulated that this
motion to suppress evidence was dispositive of the case. Id.
71 Wells, I10 S. Ct. at 1634.
72 Id. at 1635.
73 Id.
74, Id.
75 Id. (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987)).
76 The Court has used the phrase "standard criteria" to mean a policy or procedure
which must be followed during the search and which controls the actions of the police
848 [Vol. 81
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the desire to prevent inventory searches from turning into general
searches for evidence of criminal activity. 7 7
The Court then squarely disagreed with the Florida court's
statement that inventory searches must be restricted to either open-
ing all or none of the dosed containers discovered during the
search. 78 After noting the policy reasons for conducting inventory
searches, 79 Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that a police officer
must be allowed sufficient latitude to make judgments which arise
from the nature of these searches.80 ChiefJustice Rehnquist further
stated that if a state's policy allowed officers to open closed contain-
ers the contents of which were not apparent from the exterior, such
a policy would not violate fourth amendment protections; instead, it
would be rationally related to the purpose of an inventory search.81
The Court then affirmed the judgment of the Florida Supreme
Court.
B. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the
judgment. Justice Brennan first noted that this search would be
found unconstitutional under any reading of precedent.8 2 He inter-
preted the law to require that inventory searches must be regulated
to ensure no police discretion to meet constitutional standards.83
Indeed, Justice Brennan feared that insufficiently regulated in-
ventory searches would turn into broad evidence searches.8 4 To
demonstrate this fear, he began by rejecting the state of Florida's
contention that the State Trooper's Highway Patrol Manual pro-
vided sufficient regulatory guidelines.8 5 He noted, -for instance, that
officer conducting the search. Supreme Court cases have not defined the term as ap-
plied to inventory searches. See infra note 131 for a discussion of how lower courts de-
termine whether the police have adhered to standard criteria.
77 Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635 (citing Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376 (Blackmun,J., concurring)).
78 Id.
79 Id. "[Ilnventory procedures serve to protect an owner's property while it is in the
custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and
to guard the police from danger." Id. (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372).
80 Id. The Court referred to decisions made to further the taking of an inventory,
such as when to look inside a dosed container. Id.
81 id.
82 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
83 Id. at 1636 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 384 (1976) (Powell,J., concurring)). Justice Powell had written in Opperman: "[N]o
significant discretion is placed in the hands of the individual officer: he usually has no
choice as to the subject of the search or its scope." 428 U.S. at 384.
84 Id. at 1636 (Brennan, J., concurring).
85 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). While the Florida Supreme Court may have believed
that guidelines were in effect, oral argument before the Supreme Court revealed that no
8491991]
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Trooper Adams made several discretionary judgments, including
the decisions to impound the car, to perform an inventory search,
and to open the suitcase.8 6 Justice Brennan further questioned
whether an inventory search took place at all, as neither an inven-
tory sheet nor testimony that any objects were recorded elsewhere
was admitted into evidence.8 7 Rather, the testimony only estab-
lished that the search served the purpose of looking for drugs. 8
The record is replete with evidence of Trooper Adams' determina-
tion to find drugs in the car.89
Justice Brennan next assessed the majority opinion. He agreed
with the majority's holding to the extent that it affirmed the Florida
Supreme Court's ruling that total police discretion to open a locked
container during an inventory search violated fourth amendment
guarantees.90 However, Justice Brennan disagreed with the sugges-
tion that a state may adopt a policy granting the police some discre-
tion.91 Not only did the statement constitute pure dicta, but Justice
Brennan argued it misrepresented the reasoning and the holding of
Bertine.92
To support this argument, Justice Brennan reviewed the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's analysis of the Bertine decision. First, he reiter-
ated that only an inventory search procedure which limits police
discretion may be characterized as reasonable. 93 Next, he empha-
sized that footnote six of Bertine constituted part of the applicable
law.9 4 In response to Chief Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that a
state may grant police some discretion, he noted that the language
in Bertine relied on by the ChiefJustice, specifically that "nothing in
written guidelines actually existed until after the search. The State of Florida argued
instead that the search was controlled by "standard operating procedures" which were
later incorporated into the Highway Patrol Manual. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17,
30-31. See infra note 131 for a discussion of what constitutes standard criteria.
86 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Concerning the actual decision to force open the
suitcase, Trooper Adams testified, "Well, I had to take my chances." Joint Appendix,
supra note 4, at 83.
87 Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635 (Brennan, J., concurring).
88 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
89 Id. at 1636-37 (Brennan, J., concurring). The garage attendant had testified,
"[Trooper Adams] wanted to inventory the car real good because he felt sure there was
drugs in it." "There ain't nobody runs around with that kind of money on the floor-
board unless they're dealing drugs or something like that." "[Adams] had a strong
suspicion there was drugs in the car and it was probably in the suitcase." On discover-
ing the marijuana, Adams said "There it is." Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 141-42,
145, 147.
90 Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1637 (Brennan, J., concurring).
91 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
92 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
93 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
94 Id. See supra note 42 for the text of footnote six.
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Opperman... prohibits police discretion so long as that discretion is
exercised according to standard criteria," responded to an argu-
ment that because the police had discretion whether to impound the
car, the search was unconstitutional. 95 Justice Brennan concluded,
therefore, that this portion of Bertine did not apply to the question at
hand. Quoting Justice Blackmun's Bertine concurrence, Justice
Brennan reasserted that opening suitcases during an inventory
search conformed with the fourth amendment only if the police of-
ficer followed a policy that mandated opening such containers in
every impounded car.96
Finally, Justice Brennan reiterated his dissenting position in
Bertine, which stated that because opening a closed container consti-
tutes a great invasion of privacy, only consent and exigency ought to
justify doing so. 97 He concluded that "[i]f the Court wishes to re-
visit [Bertine], it must wait for another case. Attempting to cast
doubt on the vitality of the holding in Bertine in this otherwise easy
case is not justified."9 8
C. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice
Blackmun agreed that a police officer should not have complete dis-
cretion to open closed containers during an inventory search. 99 He
refrained from joining the majority opinion, however, because
rather than ruling on the facts at hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist of-
fered an opinion on the extent to which an officer may be given
discretion.' 00
Justice Blackmun agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist that a
state need not impose an all-or-nothing requirement on opening
closed containers.' 0 ' For example, a state could require the open-
ing of all containers over a certain size.10 2
Allowing an individual officer discretion to determine which
containers to open was an entirely different matter, however.' 08
Justice Blackmun believed that the majority did more than refute the
95 Id. at 1637 (Brennan, J., concurring).
96 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
97 Id. (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 387 (1987) (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan, J., dissenting)). See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), and United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), for criminal search cases which use this analysis.
98 Welas, 110 S. Ct. at 1638 (Brennan, J., concurring).
99 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
101 Id. at 1639 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
102 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
103 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
1991]
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Florida Supreme Court's all-or-nothing standard; it conjectured
about an important constitutional question not addressed by this
case. 104
D. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE
Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
After noting his approval ofJustice Blackmun's legal analysis, he im-
mediately raised the question of why this case merited a grant of
certiorari.' 05 While conceding that the Florida Supreme Court
opinion contained a minor flaw, namely requiring an all-or-nothing
standard, Justice Stevens stated that this did not justify exercising
jurisdiction. 0 6
Justice Stevens restated Justice Blackmun's belief that, not con-
tent to correct the Florida Court's error, the majority "plunge[d]
ahead with . . . one of its own."' 1 7 He observed that if a state
granted an officer discretion to open a container after viewing its
exterior, nothing would be left of "standard criteria."' 08
Justice Stevens concluded by characterizing the majority's dicta
concerning a state granting a degree of discretion to police as "un-
abashed judicial activism." 10 9
IV. ANALYSIS
A. HOW FLORIDA V. WELLS AFFECTS THE LAW OF INVENTORY
SEARCHES
Since 1976, inventory searches carried out according to a stan-
dard policy have satisfied fourth amendment standards.1 10 It is only
when the police do not have procedures governing the opening of a
closed container discovered during a search and the recording of its
contents that a new question is posed."' The new, pressing ques-
tion addresses what procedure the state may allow rather than what
the individual officer may do.'1 2 Wells suggested an answer to this
104 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
105 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
106 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). He argued that the extra protection granted to Flor-
ida citizens did not hamper law enforcement.
107 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
108 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
109 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
110 See supra note 48.
111 See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987). If a procedure exists, such as requir-
ing that the container be opened and the contents listed, then the issues remain the
same.
112 Wel&, 110 S. Ct. at 1637 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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question, but only in dicta. Specifically, the majority suggests that
the police should be granted discretion to determine the scope of an
administrative inventory search on a case-by-case basis. This solu-
tion would obviously create an unprecedented amount of police
discretion.
The facts of the various Supreme Court cases on this matter
have been quite similar. For example, Opperman involved an illegally
parked, apparently abandoned car.' 13 The police conducted an in-
ventory search according to standard criteria and found marijuana
in the unlocked glove compartment. Although the Court upheld the
search because of a reduced expectation of privacy, the search still
conformed to established department procedures. Regardless, the
marijuana was admitted into evidence. 1 4 Similarly, the police in
Bertine conducted an inventory search of an impounded vehicle;
since the search of the backpack conformed with established police
procedures, it too was declared constitutional. 15 Wells concerned
an impounded car which was searched, but no standard criteria ex-
isted to guide the search of the suitcase. Police found marijuana in
the locked suitcase in the trunk; however, the evidence was not ad-
mitted because the search was declared unconstitutional. 16 The
existence of standard criteria for the search appears to be the only
tenable distinction between these cases, especially because Wells
gave Trooper Adams permission to look in the trunk. 1 7
Since no factual distinction other than the absence of standard
criteria can be made between Opperman, Bertine, and Wells, Wells does
not change the law substantially. Since Wells rules against the state
and is the first of this line of cases to do so, Wells does limit Bertine,
but the limitation is modest. Bertine established the proposition that
regulated inventory searches which required police to open closed
containers found in the automobile were constitutional." 8 Wells
simply holds that the opening of a suitcase found in the automobile
pursuant to a policy with no requirement concerning closed con-
tainers is not constitutional." 19
However, this explicit requirement of standard criteria is over-
shadowed by the dicta regarding discretion. The case merits atten-
113 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). See supra notes 49-55 and ac-
companying text for a detailed discussion of Opperman.
114 Id.
115 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 369. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Bertine.
116 Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635.
117 Id. at 1634.
118 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 369 (1987).
119 Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1632.
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tion more for Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the Florida
court's opinion than for its outcome. The Supreme Court unani-
mously held that the Florida court correctly decided the case.' 20
Justice Brennan claimed the Wells search to be unconstitutional
under any reading of precedent.12 Yet, Chief Justice Rehnquist
claimed that the Florida court, although it reached the proper re-
sult, misstated the law. 122 He believed that the Constitution does
not require, as the Florida court believed it did, an all-or-nothing
policy for opening closed containers discovered during an inventory
search.' 23 The dicta of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion did not
discuss whether this search met constitutional requirements; rather,
it discussed to what extent a state may grant police latitude during a
search.' 24 Justice Rehnquist contended that the state may grant the
police a degree of latitude commensurate with the purpose of inven-
tory searches.' 25 Such an idea has not been contemplated or sug-
gested in any previous Supreme Court decision other than Justice
Blackmun's concurrence in Bertine, where he demanded that the po-
lice have no discretion. 126 All of the concurring opinions in Wells
voiced concern over Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement because it
indicates a significant change in the law.
Even taking into account the Wells decision, the law concerning
inventory searches has changed very little since 1976. The law has
changed only to allow the opening of closed containers pursuant to
standard criteria in Bertine.127 Justice Rehnquist's discussion of po-
lice discretion in Wells indicates that the next case concerning inven-
tory searches may very well bring a new change in the law; namely,
that a state may grant its police a degree of discretion in determin-
ing the scope of a non-criminal, administrative inventory search.
For the first time, it is possible that such a search will be upheld as
constitutional.
B. THE APPLICATION OF WELLS BY LOWER COURTS
The circuits and states have applied Bertine to inventory
searches in differing manners. Two general interpretations emerge:
some courts follow the Florida Supreme Court interpretation as ar-
120 Id. at 1635.




125 Id. For a listing of those purposes, see supra note 79.
126 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 377 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
127 Id. at 369.
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ticulated in its Wells decision, while other courts follow a more lib-
eral interpretation of Bertine, which coincides with Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dicta in Wells. The split does not center on whether an
all-or-nothing rule must control the opening of containers during
searches; rather, it focuses on the question of whether the police
have a measure of discretion to open a container. Florida is among
the jurisdictions which read Bertine to eliminate all police discre-
tion. 128 Other jurisdictions, however, read Bertine to allow discre-
tion in keeping with the goals of the inventory search, as does the
dicta in Wells. 129 The Wells Court's attempt to address this issue
through dicta may affect future Supreme Court cases, but it will not
unify the circuits immediately.
Florida does not stand alone in its preclusion of police discre-
tion. The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Porter,'30 reached a simi-
lar result. In Porter, police forced open a locked briefcase found in a
car's trunk during an inventory search. The briefcase contained
drugs. Testimony established that police had conducted the search
pursuant to local and federal policies requiring that the car be in-
ventoried thoroughly.13' The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's admission of the drugs as evidence, in part because the of-
ficers had no discretion in conducting the search.13 2
A Utah court also read Bertine to preclude discretion. In State v.
Shamblin,l33 the court held that opening a shaving kit during an in-
ventory search violated the fourth amendment, because no proce-
dures existed to regulate the opening of closed containers. 34 The
only procedure in existence at the time of the search simply stated
that "a written record shall be made of the contents of the vehi-
128 See, e.g., State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464, 468 (Fla. 1989).
129 See, e.g., United States v.Judge, 864 F.2d 1144, 1146 (5th Cir. 1989).
130 859 F.2d 83, 85 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
131 Id. Underlying these findings that standard criteria have or have not been adhered
to, is a question which is rarely (and then inconsistently) answered. Must the standard
criteria be in the form of a written, official document or will an informal policy suffice?
Decisions cover the spectrum of possibilities. The Third Circuit in United States v.
Frank, 864 F. 2d 992, 1004 (3d Cir. 1988), stated that no written policy was needed.
The Eighth Circuit in Porter simply accepted the trial court's determination that proce-
dure had been followed without inquiring into how the determination was made. Porter,
859 F.2d at 85. The United States Supreme Court in Wells noted that written policies
were not in effect during the search and did not accept the state's argument that stan-
dard procedure governed the search. Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1636 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Yet, the Wells decision did not hold that the policy must be in
writing. This question seems to be another well-suited for certiorari. Presently, trial
courts make this determination as an issue of fact without Supreme Court guidance.
132 Porter, 859 F.2d at 85.
133 763 P.2d 425 (Utah App. Ct. 1988).
134 Id. at 427.
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cle."' 13 5 The court concluded that this did not satisfy the standard of
Bertine, which requires a policy specifically addressing closed
containers.136
On the other hand, some jurisdictions interpret Bertine to com-
port generally with ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dicta in Wells concern-
ing discretion. The Third Circuit in United States v. Frank 137 held
that a formalized standard for the scope of the search was met auto-
matically when the policy calls for an inventory, since an inventory
means a listing of all items. 138 Bertine, the court held, only required
explicit criteria to determine when an inventory must take place. 39
This reasoning validates all evidence found in a properly authorized
inventory search, since everything must be listed by the officer.
Every single item in the car is ipsofacto within the scope of a consti-
tutionally permissible search.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Judge 140 held that a
DEA agent used permissible discretion in determining that a bag was a
"container;" therefore, the use of evidence found in the bag did not
violate the fourth amendment.' 4 1 The court's analysis began by
stating that drug enforcement agents have authorization to open
containers and inventory the contents.' 42 The agent must, there-
fore, exercise discretion to determine what object is a container and
whether to impound the object of the inventory. 143 The court then
analyzed whether that discretion had been exercised in a way consis-
tent with the inventory or with a view toward gaining evidence. To
make this determination, the court applied an "objective standard"
equivalent to determining whether an arrest had been the pretext to
a search. 144 The court found that the agent had used appropriate
discretion in opening a bag in Judge's car and that the $65,000
found therein was admissible.
Wells did not address the issue of how much discretion an officer
may use; it only ruled that one officer acting with total discretion
had too much. The dicta of the ruling, although it appears to en-
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989).
138 Id. at 1004.
139 Id. (emphasis added).
140 864 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990).
141 Id. at 1146.
142 Id. at 1145.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1146 n.3. The court cited "pretext search" cases which have applied an
objective standard. See, e.g., United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir.
1987) (en banc); United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 549 (11th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833 (1987).
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dorse the Fifth Circuit approach, does little to unify the various ju-
risdictions. Wells most likely will have minimal effect on the lower
courts' application of Bertine, because these courts simply may
choose to ignore the dicta and apply older, lower court rulings
which are on point. If the Court wanted to clarify the law concern-
ing the extent to which an officer may or may not exercise discretion
in such a search, then it should have selected a case which addressed
the issue. For example, the Court could have granted certiorari to
the Judge decision, which held that an officer may use discretion in
an inventory search; resolution of the constitutionality of this proce-
dure would have solved the conflict in the circuits.145
C. THE EFFECT OF PROBABLE FUTURE LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF
MOTORISTS
The Wells dicta suggests that when a state grants discretion to a
police officer to determine the scope of the inventory search, the
search will not violate the Constitution. While the Wells decision
held that unregulated inventory searches in which an officer opened
a closed container were unconstitutional as a matter of law, the ma-
jority's dicta seemed to espouse the Fifth Circuit's decision inJudge.
Recall thatJudge held that if the facts surrounding the decision to
open a container indicated that the decision was made to further the
taking of the inventory rather than merely to obtain evidence of
criminal activity, then the search does not violate the Constitu-
tion.146 The Fifth Circuit thus adopted an objective test to regulate
the officer's discretionary decisions. Specifically, "we must ask
whether the agent's action, when viewed from an objective stand-
point, can reasonably be said to have an administrative or safety mo-
tivation as opposed to an evidence seeking one."' 147 To answer this
inquiry, the court reviews objective criteria such as the facts sur-
145 The Supreme Court recently has explained that decisions are binding until ex-
pressly overturned, despite contradictory reasoning in newer cases. See Rodriguez de
Quias v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1921 (1989). The de Quyjas
Court, with the same five justices which composed the majority in Wells, reversed the
Fifth Circuit for not following a Supreme Court decision which was directly on point.
Although more recent cases have used reasoning which undermined this precedent, the
Court emphasized that the lower courts must follow those cases which control the facts
before them and leave to the Supreme Court the decision to overrule. Since Wells did
not actually address how much discretion police may exercise, this jurisprudence com-
pels lower courts to ignore ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dicta and to apply direct precedent.
146 judge, 864 F.2d at 1146. See supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion ofJudge.
147 Id. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), for a discussion of the objective
standard in related areas of law.
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rounding the search rather than to the subjective intent of the
officer.
If the discretionary standard 48 becomes the law, the intrusive-
ness of inventory searches could be increased greatly, as the change
to an objective standard may lead to unjustifiable searches. Yet, af-
ter evaluating theJudge and Bertine holdings, it appears that the dis-
cretionary standard will not be more intrusive. In fact, under
Bertine, more containers would be opened than under the discretion-
ary standard, in part because Bertine upheld police discretionary de-
cisions to impound the car, thereby necessitating the inventory
search.' 49 The discretionary standard, then, already constitutes the
only barrier between the motorist and the police in jurisdictions
which apply the Bertine rule.
By comparing Judge's objective standard (which is also the dis-
cretionary standard) to the two standards applied respectively in
Bertine and Wells, the objective standard appears less invasive than
the Bertine standard. This comparison can be made by examining a
single set of facts-the facts of Wells-and applying the three stan-
dards to it. Recall that in Wells, a state trooper stopped Wells for
speeding, noticed the smell of alcohol on his breath, administered
roadside sobriety tests, and then arrested Wells for driving under
the influence of alcohol. Upon peering into the car, the trooper no-
ticed a large amount of cash. The officer had the car towed to a
local garage where he ran an inventory search. Upon finding roach-
clips in the ashtray, he intensified his efforts, now convinced he
would find illegal drugs. The officer made several statements con-
firming this intent. He found a locked suitcase in the trunk,
surmised it contained drugs, and forced it open.150
Applying the Wells standard, the police may open containers
148 This Note refers to the actual holding of Wells as the "Wells standard" and to the
standard espoused in the Wells dicta as the "discretionary standard," which is also the
status of the law in the Fifth Circuit per theJudge decision.
149 See supra text accompanying note 65. Statistics regarding the pervasiveness of in-
ventory searches shed little light on how often evidence is obtained. For example, the
Chicago Police Department Annual Report lists only total inventories and not the
number of searches which produce evidence. The 1988 Report stated that Chicago Po-
lice made over 110,000 inventories that year in connection with an arrest. 1988 CHI-
CAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT ANNUAL REPORT 14 [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. The
number of inventories also refers to planned arrests done with a proper warrant when
firearms, for example, are seized as evidence. In addition, Chicago Police impounded
over 120,000 automobiles in 1988. ANNUAL REPORT, this note, at 16. This number in-
cludes both cars towed in connection with a crime as in Wells and abandoned vehicles as
in Opperman. These two statistics describe different events, but either may give rise to an
inventory search, as these cases illustrate.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 5-26.
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only when a policy directly mandates it; since Florida did not have a
policy concerning closed containers, the court suppressed the evi-
dence acquired as a result of opening the closed container. Only
two facts are important under the Wells standard to the determina-
tion of the constitutionality of the search. First, no policy exists for
the opening of dosed containers discovered during the inventory
search. Second, the container was opened.
Under the second standard, the Judge discretionary standard,
the confiscated drugs would be admissible if the officer's actions ob-
jectively served the purpose of creating an inventory rather than
finding evidence. The defendant had been arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol. The officer observed money on the
floorboard. These facts demanded an inventory search since the
property must be accounted for during the defendant's detention.
Valuable property also may have been inside the suitcase, so it
needed to be accounted for in the inventory. An officer could have
concluded that it contained more money. The officer's subjective
intent upon finding the suitcase is irrelevant, however. Under the
objective standard for pretext searches, the expectation of finding
evidence does not invalidate an otherwise lawful search.' 51 Hence,
under the objective standard of discretion, the evidence may be
admissible.
Finally, under the Bertine standard, police may open dosed con-
tainers only if a policy directly mandates doing so in every case. As-
sume that the state has enacted a policy requiring every container to
be opened and its contents listed. In this scenario, the police would
be required to open every closed container in the car. Thus, the
illegal drugs would constitute admissible evidence.
These examples demonstrate that the Bertine standard allows
greater intrusion by the state than does the discretionary standard,
because Bertine allows officers to open small, innocuous items like
shaving kits, change purses, and duffel bags with impunity. Open-
ing a shaving kit or a first aid kit under the objective standard would
be difficult to explain. The Bertine standard would also allow more
evidence to be admitted, since everything found in the car or in a
container would be admissible. The objective standard, however,
limits the scope of the search; officers cannot open containers which
serve no administrative or safety purpose. Evidence taken from
these containers would be suppressed.
The debate over whether discretion to impound the automobile
as upheld in Bertine also extends to the scope of inventory searches
151 See Wagner v. Higgins, 754 F.2d 186, 189-90 (6th Cir. 1985).
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overlooks an important point. Justice Brennan and those who agree
with him argue that allowing the police this discretion is dangerous,
since they may abuse it and subject citizens to pretext searches for
evidence of criminal activity; accordingly, "no discretion" regarding
the scope of the search is needed to protect fully individual rights.
Yet, according to Bertine, police may decide whether to impound the
car (and therefore whether to run an inventory search) as long as
the decision is made for administrative rather than evidence related-
reasons. 152 The test developed in Bertine to regulate police deci-
sions is exactly the same test advocated by the discretionary stan-
dard to regulate the scope of the inventory search.15 3 Any argument
about the danger of abuse loses its force when one considers that
police have been exercising discretion over whether to impound the
car (and necessitate an inventory search) since at least 1987.
Further, discretion to impound may be more important than
the discretion to determine the scope of the search. After all, an
inventory search cannot be conducted unless the car is impounded.
For example, if a trooper desires to search a car because he believes
it contains illegal drugs, he or she may create a pretext to impound
the car in order to search it. If the officer can hide illicit motives
behind that discretion, then limiting the scope of the search would
offer sparse protection. This is especially true in a jurisdiction like
Colorado where officers are instructed to open every container.
In short, because Bertine already has granted states authority to
require the opening of every container during an inventory search
and to allow officers discretion to impound (and therefore to inven-
tory) the car, a ruling which allows states to grant discretion to of-
ficers to determine the scope of the search would not erode civil
liberties.' 54
V. CONCLUSION
Wells poses two issues. First, did the Court act properly in hear-
ing and deciding the case to solve the current split in the circuits
regarding the application of Bertine? Second, does the law regarding
the admissibility of evidence obtained through inventory searches
152 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987).
153 Recall that the Florida Supreme Court held that the police acted properly in im-
pounding the vehicle, and that the roachclips were admissible evidence. State v. Wells,
539 So. 2d 464, 469 (Fla. 1989). The court cited money in the car as a reasonable
ground for impoundment. This is an "objective standard."
154 For a critical discussion of whether Bertine itself erodes civil liberties, see Note, The
Automobile Inventory Search Exception, supra note 48.
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strike the proper balance between state and individual interests? To
both questions this Note gives a qualified "yes."
Even a cursory reading of cases in the various jurisdictions
shows division on the interpretation of Bertine. The more perplex-
ing aspect of this question is why the Court chose to address the
division through Wells rather than another case. The facts in Wells
did not present the Court with an opportunity to address the ques-
tion of whether a government agent may exercise discretion during
an inventory search. Nonetheless, ChiefJustice Rehnquist chose to
address the question in dicta. Unfortunately, the use of dicta is not
an effective solution to the existing problem.
Regarding the second issue, the granting of discretion to of-
ficers during an inventory search does not tip the scales too far in
favor of the state. First, the police already have discretion whether
to impound the car and, therefore, whether to run an inventory.
There does not appear to be any reason why the police, who cur-
rently exercise discretion fairly, would exercise it unfairly when the
discretion is extended to include the scope of the search. Second,
inventory searches are exhaustive by their nature. 155 Allowing po-
lice discretion to open suitcases will extend state intrusion a small
degree in jurisdictions like Florida, where no containers presently
may be opened, but not at all in jurisdictions like Colorado, where
all containers discovered during a search are presently opened.
Florida v. Wells is notable because it portends the new shape of
fourth amendment law, but it does not threaten the rights of the
individual motorist.
CLAYTON E. KING
155 See United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1004 (3d Cir. 1988).
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